GUANGZHI CHEN

Warrington College of Business
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EDUCATION

University of Florida 2021–2027 (Expected)

- Ph.D. in Marketing

Hunan University 2017–2020

- M.S. in Applied Economics

Hefei University of Technology 2013–2017

- B.S. in Business Administration

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Online Platform, Digital Marketing, Economics of AI, Applied Game Theory, Empirical Modeling

RESEARCH

Working Papers

1. Guangzhi Chen, Zheyin (Jane) Gu, and Tianxin Zou, "Product Discoverability in E-Commerce Marketplaces with Seller External Advertising"
   - **Job Market Paper**
   - Under review at ***Journal of Marketing Research***
2. Guangzhi Chen and Zheyin (Jane) Gu, "Facilitating Progression, Preserving Gameplay: Booster Design in Video Games"
   - Under review at ***Marketing Science***

Publications

3. Guangzhi Chen and Tianxin Zou, "Personalized Pricing with Consumers' Quality Uncertainty"
   - Conditionally accepted at ***Production and Operations Management***
4. Erbao Cao and Guangzhi Chen (2021). Information Sharing Motivated by Production Cost Reduction in a Supply Chain with Downstream Competition. ***Naval Research Logistics (NRL)***, 68(7), 898–907.

Work in Progress

5. Guangzhi Chen, Baojun Jiang, and Tianxin Zou, "AI-Generated Summary of Consumer Reviews"
6. Guangzhi Chen and Zheyin (Jane) Gu, "AI Shopping Assistants and Product Recommendations"

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

"Personalized Pricing and Quality Signaling"

- 2023 Southeast Marketing Symposium April 2023
- 33rd POMS Annual Conference May 2023

"Incentivizing External Traffic to a Retail Platform: The Role of Product Discoverability"

- University of Houston's 42nd Annual Doctoral Symposium — April 2025
- 35th POMS Annual Conference — May 2025
- 2025 ISMS Marketing Science Conference — June 2025
- 56th Annual Conference of the Decision Sciences Institute — November 2025

"Facilitating Progression, Preserving Gameplay: Booster Design in Video Games"

- 36th POMS Annual Conference — May 2026

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Interests: Marketing Analytics, AI/ML in Marketing, Digital Marketing, Marketing Strategy

Instructor

- Marketing Management (Undergraduate), University of Florida — Spring 2024
  - Evaluation: $4.3/5$ (above college mean)

Teaching Assistant

- Art and Science of Pricing (Master's), University of Florida — Fall 2021

SELECTED DOCTORAL COURSEWORK

Marketing: Marketing Decision Models, Multivariate Methods, Perspectives on Consumer Behavior

Economics: Microeconomic Theory, Mathematical Economics, Game Theory, Information Economics

Statistics and Machine Learning: Regression Analysis, Theoretical Statistics, Statistical Computing, Machine Learning and Python, Machine Learning in Business, Causal Machine Learning

PROGRAMMING SKILLS

Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, MATLAB, LaTeX

HONORS AND AWARDS

ISMS Marketing Science Doctoral Consortium Fellow	2025
AMA Sheth Foundation Doctoral Consortium Fellow	2024
Doctoral Fellowship, University of Florida	2021–2027
First Prize Scholarship, Hunan University	2017–2020
Graduation with Great Distinction in Anhui Province	2017
China National Scholarship, Ministry of Education of China	2013–2016
First Prize Scholarship, Hefei University of Technology	2013–2016

REFERENCES

Tianxin Zou
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Zheyin (Jane) Gu
Professor of Marketing
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Xiajun (Amy) Pan
Associate Professor of Information Systems and Operations Management
Warrington College of Business
University of Florida
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ABSTRACTS OF REPRESENTATIVE PAPERS

"Product Discoverability in E-Commerce Marketplaces with Seller External Advertising"
*with Zheyin (Jane) Gu and Tianxin Zou (JMP, under review at **Journal of Marketing Research**)*

This paper examines how an e-commerce marketplace should design product discovery tools, which help consumers find products on the platform, accounting for sellers potentially advertising on external channels (e.g., search engines and social media) to attract consumers to the marketplace. Our paper's central finding is that the platform can profit from *strategically limiting* product discovery because of two distinct mechanisms: (1) a *traffic-expansion* mechanism, where limiting discovery mitigates advertising leakage and encourages sellers to advertise, expanding total platform traffic; (2) a *differentiation* mechanism, where limiting discovery induces some but not all sellers to advertise, creating differentiation in consumer awareness among sellers and thus softening price competition. We also show that the platform's optimal discoverability level changes non-monotonically with different market parameters, such as how substitutable competing products are and how costly or effective external advertising is. The strategic interactions of the platform and sellers further yield counterintuitive welfare consequences: when products are stronger substitutes, despite more intense price competition, sellers' profit can increase while consumer surplus can decrease; and when sellers' external advertising becomes less costly or more effective in attracting consumers, both sellers and consumers can be worse off.

"Personalized Pricing with Consumers' Quality Uncertainty"
*with Tianxin Zou (Conditionally accepted at **Production and Operations Management**)*

We examine a firm's personalized pricing (PP) strategies in markets where consumers are uncertain about product quality. In such markets, prices serve not only as a tool for price discrimination but also as a means of conveying quality information to consumers. We reveal that a firm faces a tradeoff between adopting PP to better price discriminate among consumers and not adopting it to signal its high quality. We find that a high-quality firm should adopt PP only when its product quality is known to either a very small or a very large fraction of consumers, and when its high-quality product, on average, offers either very low or very high additional value to consumers relative to a low-quality product. Moreover, the high-quality firm may charge consumers personalized prices less than their willingness to pay to signal its quality in equilibrium, deviating from first-degree price discrimination when consumers are informed about quality. Counterintuitively, when more consumers know product quality or when the high-quality product provides higher average value to consumers, consumer surplus and social welfare may decrease, but a low-quality firm's profit may increase. Furthermore, the firm's profit can be lower when its personalized pricing leverages more information about consumer characteristics. Randomized experiments provide evidence that a personalized price is a weaker signal of objective product quality than a uniform price.

"Facilitating Progression, Preserving Gameplay: Booster Design in Video Games"
*with Zheyin (Jane) Gu (Under review at **Marketing Science**)*

In single-player, multi-level video games, sustaining player progression is central to retention and long-run monetization. To facilitate progression, developers often provide players with boosters, consumable tools that can reduce their effort to clear a level. In this paper, we study a developer's optimal booster design, accounting for its impact on a player's gameplay across levels. In a model with two game levels where a booster is offered to help the player clear the first level and move forward to the second level, we show that increased booster power affects the player's total gameplay time non-monotonically. In particular, as progression aid strengthens, the player's playtime initially rises and then falls, indicating that a developer monetizing through playtime should offer a moderately powerful booster. However, when the developer has a strong incentive to profit from booster sales, a sales–time tension emerges: the developer optimally increases the booster power and price to extract player surplus, although doing so can compress gameplay. When this incentive becomes very strong, a powerful booster can even reduce the player's total playtime relative to when no booster is offered. In addition, we show that the optimal booster power and price vary with players' perceived value of level progression, suggesting the benefits of booster customization. Interestingly, for a player with higher valuation for progression, the developer may offer a booster with lower power but charge a higher price.